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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LOOKING BEYOND THE EVILDOERS: SARBANES-OXLEY AND
THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE LAW

THOMAS L. GREANEY*
The simple, made-for-television account of the notorious scandals at
Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and most recently, HealthSouth, tells a tale of greed
and the ineluctable temptations of money and power. A handful of evildoers,
to use a currently popular expression, were able to corrupt their corporations’
accountability systems and thereby profit personally. John Biggs’ thoughtful
Millstone Lecture provides a more nuanced—and perhaps more alarming—
account suggesting that the key lessons of the past decade include warnings of
deep-seeded malfunctions.
This essay agrees with John Biggs’ assessment that problems infecting
modern corporate governance are systemic and suggests that they are not
remedied by legislation that relies exclusively on punishing evildoers or
improving information dissemination. It also serves as a reminder that
unintended consequences inevitably arise from sweeping legislative reforms
and that political realities should dampen enthusiasm about federal remedies.
IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
If pressed for a signal indicator that something has gone badly amiss,
consider the following statistics concerning the volume and impact of the
restatements of earnings by corporations over the last five years. More than
ten per cent of all listed American companies restated earnings between 19972002 at a cost of $100 billion in stock declines in the immediate three days
after announcement.1 Professor Cox’s epigram that “restated earnings are
fraud sans scienter”2 captures well the import of this phenomenon. Investors
have just as surely been misled, experienced real losses, and lost confidence in
capital markets, even if erroneous earning reports and other forms of

* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University
School of Law.
1. Jonathan Weil, Deals & Deal Makers: Restatements of Earnings Have Multiplied, WALL
ST. J., June 7, 2001, at C15.
2. James D. Cox, What’s In a Principle? Professional Accounting, Audit Committees and
the Metrics of Financial Reporting, Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium
(Feb. 21-22).
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mismanagement are the product of neglect and technically lack intent under the
legal definition of fraud.
Although many assessments of the nature of the corporate governance
problem are available, the core issues can be broadly summarized, to borrow
from the Powers Report, as “a fundamental default of leadership and
management,”3 and to borrow from Professor Coffee, the dereliction by
“gatekeepers.”4 The rather startling consensus is that the key mechanisms of
investor protection that academics and policy analysts have long heralded have
simply not worked. These protections can be grouped into four categories:
 So-called gatekeepers (accountants, lawyers and market analysts)
whose job is to stake their reputation on assuring that information is
disclosed and procedures are followed.
 Financial incentives (bonuses, stock options, etc.) that were thought to
align stockholders’ interests with those of management.
 Legal sanctions and duties found in securities and fraud law and state
fiduciary law that direct managers and gatekeepers to act as selfless
agents serving the interests of shareholders and the corporation.
 “Trust” or internalized norms that operate to induce reliance based on
one’s integrity and character rather than on whether the individual has
external incentives to refrain from exploiting another.5
The sweeping, post-Enron reforms aim, to a certain extent, to repair all of
these protections. In Sarbanes-Oxley6 and in the efforts of the reinvigorated
enforcement agencies (including both the SEC and state securities regulators
and attorneys general), one sees strong measures designed to improve the
functioning of gatekeepers by empowering corporate audit committees,
assuring the independence of outside auditors, reducing conflicts, and
improving information dissemination through public reporting. The new
regime seeks to correct misaligned financial incentives by compelling returns
of bonuses and stock options where restatements occur and providing
accelerated, more reliable disclosures.
Legal sanctions are improved,
somewhat controversially, by federalizing corporate governance law (e.g.
forbidding loans to top management and dictating the composition and role of
key board committees) and strengthening criminal penalties for securities law
violations. Trust, arguably the safeguard least susceptible to enhancement by

3. William C. Powers, Jr., Chairman of the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of
Directors of Enron Corporation, Testimony at the United States House of Representatives before
the Committee on Financial Services (Feb. 4, 2002).
4. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “Its About Gatekeepers Stupid,” 57 BUS.
LAW. 1403 (2002).
5. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1751 (2001).
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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legal reforms,7 is enhanced by strengthening formal independence of board
members and gatekeepers, mandating internal policies on ethics, and imposing
specific ethical duties on accountants and lawyers.
ASSESSING REMEDIES: UNQUANTIFIABLE GOALS AND UNANTICIPATED COSTS
What should we expect from these reforms? More fundamentally, by what
metric should we measure their success? It is argued here that the most
important improvements from Sarbanes-Oxley will not be readily observed and
that some unintended consequences must be expected. That benefits are
inchoate, of course, does not make them less important; the point is that the
law’s most useful role will be in shaping norms.
“TONE AT THE TOP”: The central issue identified in the academic
literature as impairing efficient functioning in corporations is the problem of
agency. Not only is ownership separated from control, but also boards and
officers control the flow of information that investors and gatekeepers require
to ensure effective and efficient management of the corporation. Will the
reforms succeed in changing CEOs’ receptiveness to the spirit of full
disclosure, accurate reporting, and the free flow of information upwards from
below?8 Many Sarbanes-Oxley reforms such as CEO and CFO certification
are designed to change the attitude and direction emanating from the top
echelons. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this and other changes hinges on
its effect on attitudes and prevailing norms within the boardrooms and
executive suites.
INFRASTRUCTURE: Will Sarbanes-Oxley trigger the changes in the
regulatory and market infrastructure necessary for the reforms to work? To
take one example, there is a serious problem with concentration in the
accounting industry. What used to be the Big Ten accounting firms has shrunk
to what John Biggs calls the Final Four. Even that high concentration level is
misleading, as for some industries only two or three accounting firms are
viable options. Sarbanes-Oxley mandates a study of the issue, but a major
question remains whether there will be a sufficiently vibrant market for

7. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 576 (2001).
8. SEC Commissioner Adkins described the Act’s ambitions to change attitudes as follows:
A lesson from the recent corporate failures in America is the importance of corporate
culture and what we call the “tone from the top.” A CEO’s tolerance or lack of tolerance
of ethical misdeeds and a CEO’s philosophy of business conveys a great deal throughout
the organization . . . . It is my hope that Sarbanes-Oxley may indirectly help directors in
this regard. The law’s effect will be to make board members be more inquisitive.
Therefore, questions that might have seemed to be “hostile” to management two years ago
will now be seen to be in furtherance of a director’s function.
Paul S. Atkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content and Status of Implementation,
Remarks at the University of Cologne, Germany (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch020503psa.htm.
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accounting services for the largest companies so as to allow the kind of
shopping and, ideally, inter-firm rotation that Sarbanes-Oxley encourages.
Similar questions can be directed at the functioning of the market for
investment analysts, particularly whether reforms will ameliorate conflicts of
interest or engender new avenues for abuse. Finally, a linchpin of SarbanesOxley is the impact of the Public Company Accountancy Oversight Board. To
fulfill its mission—bringing a measure of public oversight and independence to
the generation of standards and practices of the accountancy profession—the
Board will require acceptance from industry and support from political and
administrative centers. The wrangling over the selection of the first chairman
of the Oversight Board, which included allegations that the accounting industry
resisted John Biggs’ appointment because he was too well-versed in the issues
facing the industry,9 highlights the risk that even the best-crafted reforms will
be vulnerable to interest group pressures.
LAW REFORM: By some accounts, Sarbanes-Oxley may mark the
beginning of a shifting paradigm in corporate law. For one thing, it may
portend increased federalization of corporate governance law, which has long
been the province of the states.10 Further, it may signal the reinvigoration of
the fiduciary duty standards, which courts have watered down considerably
and from which legislatures have permitted corporations to “opt out.” Students
of corporate law today find it astonishing that it was not until 1996 that the
Delaware courts imposed upon directors a fiduciary duty to monitor
compliance with the law.11 Equally surprising, only in 1998 did they discover
a generalized fiduciary responsibility to make truthful disclosures, even when
not seeking shareholder actions.12
At the same time, it is important to remember some of the things SarbanesOxley did not do. It did not reverse the actions by Congress and the Supreme
Court that have arguably watered down legal sanctions on auditors and
gatekeepers.13 Nor did it directly tackle the misaligned incentives among

9. See Roel C. Campos, Statement at the Open Commission Meeting of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on the New Public Accounting Oversight Board, (Oct. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch600.htm (dissenting from nomination of
William Webster for chairmanship and describing reports of accounting industry lobbying efforts
to oppose John Biggs for that position).
10. For a critical account of Sarbanes-Oxley’s move toward federalizing corporate
governance rules, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26
REGULATION (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=389403.
11. In Re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Chan. 1996).
12. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley did not attempt to strengthen private enforcement of the federal
securities laws by amending the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which may
have deterred or impeded meritorious lawsuits. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (2000). Nor did it review
the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
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executives, for example, by increasing the holding period for insider stock
ownership. It eschewed taking bolder action on conflicts of interest, such as
mandatory rotation of audit firms. Relying heavily on disclosure as a curative,
Sarbanes-Oxley may be faulted for neglecting to significantly improve the
capacities of those who receive, analyze, and disseminate that information.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: Critics of Sarbanes-Oxley ask
whether the realignment of responsibilities has gone too far.14 In placing so
much responsibility on the shoulders of the audit committee, for example, the
law may create new problems. Will audit committee members, especially their
financial experts, become more like management: full-time employees who
are dependent on their high salaries and subject to conflicts of interest?
Consider, for example, the list of characteristics that an SEC Commissioner
recently suggested were needed for members of the audit committee:
skepticism, inquisitiveness, and willingness to seek out advice from sources
external to the corporation. While the need for a truly independent audit
committee cannot be questioned, the reforms may risk creating an insulated
center of power subject to abuse. The ready analogy drawn by some is to the
special prosecutor legislation, which responded to perceived conflicts of
interest in the Department of Justice by requiring referrals to independent
prosecutors of certain allegations of criminal activity at high levels of the
executive branch.15 Other instructive lessons about well-meaning reforms are
available. For example, Congress’s decision to prohibit companies from
deducting compensation paid to officers in excess of $1 million unless paid
pursuant to a plan approved by the shareholders16 may have helped fuel the
precipitous growth in stock options as a means of executive compensation. In
retrospect, this decision can be seen as paradoxically aligning management
interest too closely with investors’ interests in that it created overwhelming
incentives to enhance short term profits by any means possible.
CONCLUSION
The old saw is that you can’t legislate morality. But why not? If
unchecked capitalism can create a climate in which community leaders betray
their neighbors, law can surely effect some measure of change. Fiduciary
duties, disclosure obligations, and reporting up and out by gatekeepers may
help change attitudes, shift corporate cultures, and reinforce internalized
boundaries of conduct. At bottom, they can prevent managers from putting
themselves in positions of conflicting interests, and they can reduce

N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), which held that private aiding and abetting actions against attorneys
and auditing firms could not be brought under Rule 10b-5.
14. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17.
15. Id.
16. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000).
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temptations, or what I was taught to call the “occasions of sin”—a good day’s
work for any statute.

